Can Bureaucrats be Paid Like CEOs? School Principal Incentives for Anemia Reduction in Rural China

Event: Making Impact Evaluation Matter (Main Event)

Can Bureaucrats be Paid Like CEOs? School Principal Incentives for Anemia Reduction in Rural China

04 September 2014

Author / Speaker:

Renfu Luo, Chinese Academy of Sciences - Email the author | Other materials by the author

Grant Miller, Stanford University - Email the author | Other materials by the author

Sean Sylvia, Stanford University - Email the author | Other materials by the author

Scott Rozelle, Stanford University - Email the author | Other materials by the author

Marcos Vera-Hernandez, University College London - Email the author | Other materials by the author

View Slides

This presentation shares findings of a study on performance incentives for school administrators and how their responses to incentives vary with the amount of resources under their control. The study focuses specifically on the implementation of new, school-based programs to reduce childhood anemia in rural People’s Republic of China.

Geographical Focus:

China, People's Republic of

Type of Content:

Learning Event

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