The views expressed in this material are the views of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank, or its Board of Governors, or the governments they represent. ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this presentation and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use. The countries listed in this presentation do not imply any view on ADB's part as to sovereignty or independent status or necessarily conform to ADB's terminology.

# Monitoring of COVID-19 Health Impacts and Dynamic Adjustment of Health System Response

SERD Policy Network Workshop

"Measuring the Impact of COVID-19"

November 9-10, 2020

Ye Xu, Health Specialist, SEHS

## Overview


COVID-19 impact on population health

 Health system for health security (HSfrHS) framework for outbreak detection and response


 The dynamic adjustment of intervention measures and policies to suppress transmission


## COVID-19 is first-of-all a health emergency

As of 9 November, 50.3 million confirmed cases and 1.2 million deaths reported worldwide. (WHO COVID-19 Dashboard)



## SERD countries have fared well in the pandemic






As of 9 November 2020




# COVID-19 affects all health services


- Routine immunization rates dropped.
   Vaccination coverage gaps widened.
- WHO and UNICEF warn of resurgence of measles and polio
- Mounting backlog of delayed access to care, including poor management of long-term conditions, avoidance or delay of seeking care, leading to worse outcomes.

## Lao PDR: OPD and IPD trends





### Lao PDR: immunization trends



### Prevention and treatment for noncommunicable diseases

 WHO survey confirmed that partial or complete disruption to noncommunicable diseases services are severe and global (June 2020)

• In the majority (94%) of countries responding, ministry of health staff working in the area of NCDs were partially or fully reassigned to support COVID-19.

 Cancellations of planned treatments, a decrease in public transport available and a lack of staff.

Cardiovascular emergencies (31%)

Hypertension treatment (53%)

Diabetes (49%)

Rehabilitation services (63%)

**Cancer (42%)** 


## Replicated or exacerbated health inequality

- Elderly people faces higher mortality risks
- So are males...
- Social determinants were found to be significantly correlated with the risks of infection and death from COVID-19.
- Healthcare and social service-related occupations face excess risks


## Country Preparedness for Outbreaks

- International Health Regulations (2005) and WHO benchmarks for IHR capacities define requirements and recommended actions that countries can take to build capacities to better manage health emergencies.
- Asia Pacific Strategy for Emerging Diseases and Public Health Emergencies (APSED III) provides a common framework for action in the Asia Pacific region for strengthening IHR capacities.









## Outbreak Notification Requirement under IHR

- One of the most important aspects of IHR (2005) is the requirement that countries detect and report events that may constitute a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC).
- Once a WHO member country identifies an event of concern, the country must assess the public health risks of the event within 48 hours.
- If the event is determined to be notifiable under the IHR, the country must report the information to WHO within 24 hours.
- Always notifiable diseases: smallpox, polio, new type of human influenza, SARS + Other potentially notifiable diseases/events

## WHO benchmarks for IHR capacities

#### **Core capacities (# of benchmarks)**

- National Legislation, Policy and Financing (3)
- IHR Coordination, Communication and Advocacy, Reporting (2)
- National Laboratory System and Biosafety and Biosecurity (6)
- Surveillance (3)
- Human Resources (4)
- Preparedness (2)
- Emergency Response Operations (3)
- Medical Countermeasures and Personnel Deployment (3)
- Risk Communication (3)

#### IHR capacities for hazards



Zoonotic Disease (2)



Food Safety(2)



Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR)(4)



Chemical Events (1)



Radiation Emergencies (1)

#### Other IHR capacities



Points of Entry (2)




Linking Public Health and Security Authorities (1)



Immunization (2)


# Linkages to health system pillars and other sectors supportive functions in the HSfrHS framework



# Maturity model

Capacities are graded in five levels:

- No capacity,
- Limited,
- Developed,
- Demonstrated,
- Sustainable.



## Sample HSfrHS benchmarks for IPC

CAPACITY LEVEL	WHO BENCHMARKS FOR IHR CAPACITIES	HEALTH SYSTEMS CAPACITIES	OTHER SECTORS CAPACITIES
LIMITED CAPACITY	<ul> <li>Ad hoc mechanism for IPC</li> <li>Assessment/review for selected hospital</li> </ul>	<ul><li>IPC committee, guidelines</li><li>Assessment/review for selected hospital</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Provision of safe water</li> <li>Ad hoc IPC for animal farm and supply chain</li> </ul>
DEVELOPED CAPACITY	<ul> <li>IPC committee and action plan implemented &amp; monitored for IHR hazards at the national level</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Disseminate and implement guidelines at the national level</li> <li>Ensure IPC pillars in place at the national level and monitor them</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Access to WASH facilities at the national level hospitals/farms</li> <li>IPC at selected animal farm and supply chain</li> </ul>
DEMONSTRATED CAPACITY	<ul> <li>IPC committee and action plan implemented &amp; monitored for IHR hazards at the sub-national levels</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Disseminate and implement IPC guideline at the sub-national levels</li> <li>Ensure IPC pillars in place at the subnational levels and monitor them</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Access to WASH facilities at all levels</li> <li>IPC at sub-national level for animal farm and supply chain</li> </ul>
SUSTAINABLE CAPACITY	Demonstrate effectiveness of IPC measures during event	• Effective¹ IPC coverage nationwide	<ul> <li>Effective coverage of WASH nationwide</li> <li>Effective IPC coverage nationwide for animal farm and supply chain</li> </ul>

## Challenges to identify a novel disease in the first place

- Why is it so difficult to identify these potentially dangerous and novel diseases in the first place?
- Case: A single MERS patient led to the infection of 16 people, leading to an outbreak that affected 44 people in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.



A 46- year-old man presented to the hospital emergency department Diarrhea; Coughing; Shortness of breath; Kidney failure



Hemodialysis in medical ward




ICU

Referral hospital for MERS

It is often difficult to diagnose pneumonia, one of the key symptoms of the disease, in patients suffering renal and cardiac failures.

## COVID Response Strategies and Policies



**Economic and Social Cost** 

## Dynamic Adjustment of Response Policies

- Decision between broad restrictions and a targeted approach with high-risk populations – not one approach fits all.
  - The Great Barrington Declaration petitioners claim lockdowns are unnecessary and champions the herd immunity approach.
  - Rebuttal from the John Snow Memorandum.
  - China and some other countries religiously enforced strict lockdown, then testing, contact tracing and quarantine measures, to successfully contain the outbreak.
- Effective implementation of policies and cooperation of citizens
- Whole-of-government approach and cross-sectoral collaboration



#### New Normal Medical Service Model Piloted in Pattani, Thailand

- Patients that do not need to visit the healthcare facility are supported by remote consultation (telemedicine) and drugs are delivered to them, often by village volunteers.
- Arrangements for patients that need to visit healthcare facilities are modified, taking into account the patient pathway and the need to maintain physical distancing.
- When more intensive care is required, services have been made safer for patients and health care providers such as upgraded ventilation within facilities.

## The silver linings

• All previous pandemics – the 1918 flu pandemic, SARS, Ebola – were eventually under control, and the experience will help us prepare for future major outbreaks.

• The most cost-effective approach to handle this type of crisis is *prevention*. Convincing case for greater investment in the global health security architecture and universal health coverage.

• Paradigm shifts in development, rethinking our relationship with the environment, with other species, and with other communities.



Thank you