Issues in Reforms of State-Owned Enterprises: Perspectives from ADB's Experiences

11 June 2018 ADB-ADBI Forum on Governance and Institutions

Korean Development Institute, Seoul

Content

- 1. Context
- 2. Analytical concepts (based on New Institutional Economics)
 - Information asymmetry
 - Transaction costs
 - Credible commitment
 - Political economy
- 3. ADB's work:
 - Approach
 - Sectoral and country investments
 - Issues faced
- 4. Three lessons from broad governance reforms (with implications for SOE reforms)
- 5. Issues for discussion

Gambhir Bhatta Asian Development Bank, Manila In early 2017, Moody's Investors Service warned that specific countries (such as PRC, Venezuela) were most exposed to debt from SOEs.

Indeed, Moody's warns that for many countries SOEs represent a material source of financial risk for governments, <u>a risk on contingent liabilities for governments that ranks after financial sector crises and natural disasters</u>.

"Sovereign Contingent Liabilities; Public Enterprises Represent a Material Source of Fiscal Risk to Some Sovereigns," Global Credit Research, 25 January 2017.

"State control has helped Alrosa during previous slumps... That's our competitive advantage over DeBeers" – Igor Sobolev, Deputy Chief Executive, Alrosa, Russia

"Alrosa treading a rocky path towards eventual privatization." Financial Times, Tuesday, 11 April 2017

Some Relevant Context

"London goes on offensive in effort to entice Aramco IPO" (FT, 14 July 2017)

Said to be the world's biggest flotation (Saudi Aramco is targeting a \$2tn valuation before its IPO in 2018)

List a 5% stake in Saudi Aramco; the biggest pubic offering ever.

But London would propose new listing for SOEs that would loosen governance restrictions (exempt companies controlled by governments from some curbs)

Friday, March 23, 2018

The thru Scokmit Mercit

The Business 7

Politics Matthew Hooton Flying in the face of reason

Why should the government own a majority stake in Air NZ?

Interface of us who still factions to mainstream occounties have Shane Jones to thank fire spain. highlighting the humory of a government minister owning 61.9 per cent of Air New Zealand

"This waar't Jones" howerton, NZ First is polling well below 6 per cent and a good stouch with the corporate syster always delivers it greater grites even than turnigention. Add in Jonese role as the provinces' champion and why wouldn't he go all-in against. Air New Zenfami's withdrawal from Relation, Whetherthe, Wesepart and new Kegith?"

Loadilly for Jonas, Air NZ project its role as corporate villain to performer, whengoing to Pinorece Minister Grant Bobertoor about the alleged atmost on the adaptempropense.

As it happens, it doesnot along an responsible for the government's fills per out absorbaiking in Air NZ, so Jones can say anything he likes.

Even were Jones a shareholding consister, since when here develoption publicly available information about the companies in orbits they invest, as long as it orbits here, the invest, of companies

Company	Market Capitalisation	Gost.Share	15E flate	
Meridian	\$7.65	\$3.90	41.3	
Mercury	\$44b	\$2.3b	Z1.4	4000
Air New Zealand	\$3.85	\$2.0b	10.6	
Genesas and	\$2.4h	\$1.7b	21.6	
Total	\$18.25	SRAD		1000
æ	-	A State		

the MOMs, or any other companies on the NZX.

In their typically excellent lovestment Statement this wook, Robertson's own Tressury officials gave five pinto-English reasons why the government abouid own things

 When the social and scenamic henefits of government ownership ontoxigh the costs

 When service delivery involves eportshood assots that the private sector has trouble providing on an origing hous

 When risk cannot be efficiently transforced to the private sector through a contract

When the government has the most relevant expertise

 When the government norts to be directly accountable for outcomess None applies to the MOMA. Perhaps rivaled only by

NZ Treasury says 5 reasons why govt should own things:



acted media existences and 3. Install his point of view with the manual work. This whole political d 4. Grant Rober 5.

1. Benefits (social, eco) > costs

- Private sector not able to provide regularly
- Risk cannot be transferred to private sector through a contract
- Government has the most relevant expertise

5. Government needs to be directly accountable for outcomes

GOVERNANCE THEMATIC GROUP

Corporate Games are Fun, they also **Contain Learnings for Executives**

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Rest of the employees were scared to came to work on Monday thinking a Friday it is their furn meet ARTST DATE: MPACT

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> > **Not having a** 'how to' script to effect layants NPACT. Since no B.

Strings linches

BUDGET TO TARGET FISCAL DEFICIT **Pranab Losing Sleep Over Subsidy Burden**

> As finance minister when i think of enormity of the subsidies to be provided, i lose my sleep. There is no doubt"

PRANAB MURHER // I Planter-Mainter

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budget.

Pranab Mukhurjas has sold in in liking sleep over the government shellooring subsidy bill, a rary expression of canditar on a amainty occnonce subject from an otherwise costrained finance minister trigatring talk the openating busigest could be barals set substities. The the finance miniater when I think of enor-

mity of the estudies to be provided, i have my alsep. There is no doubs," Multherise said on Wodramday in his address to a conference on Public Describution by slem and Storage. The underlying message in his comment some

tions. "He is becaming more confid and is hindof preparing the ground that nothing dramatat (in the form of givenness)

should be expected from the Analysts said budget," said Stand Kinha, ar-Mohdharjew In bler scorrottal with CRESH. preparing the If whe Mukhesting's second SPIRITUAL PROPERTY. broad film in recent wasks that the birdget for 2022-18 on March no-grametic stages should in will be been about tax givebe expected aways and more about flacal inresolidation, an arms considseed as a mapler blemish on his astriatey's performance and

"As finance minister when I think of enormity of the subsidies to be provided, I lose my sleep. There is no doubt"

MARKETS & INVESTING

Analysis. Equities

India's privatisations back on track

This year's bull run makes conditions ripe for selling off state-owned companies

WIRAN STACEY - NEW CRUH The stellar run in Indian equition this year has reignited interest in a long trames from state ownership re None the Tri has unrestined t ous of dollars' worth of sta erprises, spunning the national or nd gas company, insurance, and parts if the railways. A tack of political will, what trade unions and, es schoerne market conditions, have

in an right for ministers to hit seir disinvestment target for the first me in seven years, not least because stocks have enjoyed a world ting bull run. The benchmars



"For years, New Delhi has promised to divest billions of dollars' worth of state enterprises... A lack of political will, powerful trade unions, and occasionally, adverse market conditions have stymied the plans"

Thursday & April 2017

"It needs to restructure, which it is not able to – it cannot get rid of people that easily because there are too many union issues. It positively needs a change in mindset from the government".

Airlines. Legacy carriers Air India flies into uncertain future

Auditor raises concerns as struggle with debt and costs continues despite bailout

ALDEA RAM - NEW DELHI

It was a building moment for india's national artifier.

Air India, which finally normed a profit bast year after at least eight years of pretax losses, was revealed has month by the country's auditor to have understated its operating losses by Rasi-L2ba (\$964m) between 2012 and 2015.

In a sharphy worded report, india's comptraller and auditor general sold the state-yun corrier had failed to meet targets on selling assets. Arreing it to take on coeffy short-term loans that had "largety croded" the benefits of a Rostitutionisotin 2012 by New Delis. The release, which cause loss than a your after Air ladia returned to profile



"The transformation process that we have under way (for Air India) includes governance, operating performance, fleet acquisition, and ownership changes" (India's Aviation Minister quoted in FT, 26 June, 2017) Performance (based on 2015 report)

- Loss: Rs. 7b annually (approx \$70m)
- Accumulated losses (FY 14/15): Rs. 26.7b
- Liability to GON: Rs. 49.6b as share capital, and Rs. 94b as secured longterm loan

Some constraints

NEA self-assessment

- HR lapses (eg, 25% of posts vacant, including 5 of 9 at Deputy MD level)
- Government unwilling to revise tariff upwards

• High-level commitment missing

External-assessed

- Political interference, including frequent government changes
- Organizational lapses (eg, unionism, lack of meritocracy)*

Nepal Electricity Authority

NEA is one of three public utility SOEs (the other two: water and telecoms); and is the biggest SOE to run on a loss every year

From IMF, Article IV consultation report for Nepal, 2015...

Directors stressed the importance of unlocking the country's hydropower generation potential and sustained reforms to improve the investment climate... large SOEs in the energy sector should be put on a sound financial footing to reduce losses and contingent liabilities.

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Oil & gas. Class

Investors reel as Petrobras corruption claims persist

Prosecutors allege ex-directors conspired with politicians to defraud state-run company

HELEAHY - NO DE MAERO

Torontoy W. July 2018

Aggrieved investors in Brazil's Petrobras have affered over the past two pures as an investigation has the state may all company has showed how cerrapt former directors spear the group's hands an everything from art collections to RangeRover Eveques.

But the most recent allegations in the scandal, in which procentere claims homes disectors completel with publictions and contractors to default the company, bike this one step further.

Prosecutors claim Paulo Pernin, a former transurer of Brazil's entwhile rulag Wockers' party, took morer orig inally destined for a research and developtimate online for Petrobras's ultrodeeporter officials and used it to pay a amba queen a morelity stipend.

"At the request of Fuelo Perceira, there were made diverse payments to the non-governmental organization isotestade increatives or itemeficientic Estado Moior du Restings, a samba school, and people Inded to R. such as Virtune Restrigues da likva, the battery quees," sold a court document outlining for Permitrik arnest, Mr Perrolan was not available for communit.


The stream of corruption claims is proving on irritiant for Petrobras, both netwith investigators in Brazil but with institutional investors in New York. In a class-action Investi had by the Hamilton, the company's lowyers, didnot immediately respond to explose for commercy. Pedro Percete, Petrolicasis new chief executive, said last month that the company was a victim of fend, estimated to have cost it about 32.30m in losses directly related to compilion.

Analysis highlight how any damages ruling against Petrolenss would add to its already encorraces debt load. Some in the market say the investor lawsuit could ensuit as the third-largest poposi in a securities fraud case after Encou and World Cone.

Concern over Petrobrack financial profile is driven by its large amount of isorrowings coming due = \$28.5 she sut of total grous debt of \$126 in - between Apul this year and the end of 2007. The company has the largest debt land in the energy infinity.

"Shay have to sell a hit of assets or have market access to avert a driash," says Nymia Almeida of Moody's investors Service.

The addit that while the investor invanit was factored into Moody's B5 junk rating for the company, which implies some herei of government support for Patrobras abouid it run into greater floancial difficulty, the details of any



payout would be important. This includes how long Petrobras would have to find the money.



The steady stream of allegations again

1999-2012: ~ 1/3 of all bribery cases involved bribery of SOE employees, while 80.1% of the value of all bribes were paid to SOE employees*

Norway's largest pension fund blacklisted Petrobras over concerns that the state-controlled oil company at the center of a Brazilian bribery scandal is "prone to further corruption problems beyond its home market". It says there is "unacceptable risk" of future problems (and "severe corruption") at the company.*





"The greatest challenge Asia faces in its endeavors to realize the Asian Century: transforming governance and institutions."



ASIA 2050

Realizing the Asian Century

Executive Summary

Core Concept 1: Information Asymmetry

Imperfect Information Paradigm: incorporates information (or the lack of it) into standard economic analysis to explain the rise of certain institutional settings and lack of efficiency

Inefficient institutions result from imperfect and costly information

1. Lack of information across time (we know more at time T-1 than at T+1)

2. Asymmetry across space (eg., between core and periphery; organizations, etc.)

3. Asymmetry when static in perception and interpretation (*differential in making sense of available information*)

4. Proximity to policymaker/regulator (varied access to decision-makers, separate from space asymmetry)

Application: National **Resource Governance** Institute analyzed 74 state-owned extractive enterprises (to assess how countries manage oil, gas and mineral sectors). Called on Saudi Aramco to "disclose closely held data ahead of its planned 2018 IPO". Its research ranked the country among the world's most opaque oil-producing nations.* (64th out of 74)

Therefore, all players are at best boundedly rational...

Core Concept 2: Transaction Costs (TCs)

Differential access to, and ability to interpret, information (as well as voting for association) leads to <u>transaction costs</u>



North (1990): "The inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the third world"

Core Concept 3: Credible Commitment (CC)

- Assumption of a repetitive game
- Expectation: of *quid pro quo* in commitment to transaction
- Policy reversals—or more aptly, the threat (or perception) of such reversals—lead to a failure to commit credibly
- Corollary of CC: <u>credible threat</u>

$\mathbf{CC} \downarrow = \mathbf{TCs} \uparrow$

Core Concept 4: Political Economy

Who pays?

MANAGEN

WHY SHOULD PEOPLE BEAR THE LOSSES OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES

Koshish Adaryu Kathmundu

DAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2012

very year the imer, provides loats, incurs boil debianthence manages o any public enterrises — covering the cases from the incurs includence pay of their hard estraid motion. But is in fair for the people to bear the cost of the failure of public enterpress?

THE PRELUD

'The government of Nepal has provided total loan aritourning to Bs 60.18 billion to public esterprises, of which Rs 10.25 billions was grained in the flacal year 2010 11, alme. This amount outld have been better utilised. According to Independent Power Protuneers' Association Nepal, the production of one MW of electricity roads Un 100 million, which means 604.4 MW been produced with Ro18 billion, solving To per cent of power remains in the control Similarity establishing a cohesil establishing as chead enter a solving the solution of mean produced with Ro18 billion, solving To per cent of power remains in the control Similarity establishing a chead establishing a chead establishing as chead

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able to generate substantial period over the last thread years with the currrent fiscal year's profit renting sector tills 8000 thread the sector tills 8000 the sector till 80000 the sector till 80000 the sector till 80000 the sector till 8

As public acterprises actor that public acterprises to the Negot Elise and Negot 007100 point in NEA 35 far from addressing its profilem act yet the gover memory and and services flow that have been reduced in the fail we could ensity

tion. On the other hand, NEA and NOC have absolute monopoly in the market, making

reakingview

them less productive and innovative. One of the best pressible solutions could be to highlight the autorprines that non-mining in best and abut these down completely Privatisation could be another solution but it has to be counted with politics to ensure transparency and avoid desettance consequences the in Barrisidmi Brick and Tile Pacincy. Dischart Public Mills and Birristance Jain Mills Accoller ware to deal with this problem in

Another way to near an appendix to private management or firms requiring transparency in competitive building procedure, accounts entity, outlish and hareoursette process.

Some pertinent questions are: Should the government run public enterprises at air Why not leave to to the market which does not use public money, ensures competition and is constantly innovering to provide better quality products and services at competitive primes? Should the group at the prime of the primes. "Other issues like corruption, inefficiency, low productivity, trade union issues, political appointments and political manipulation in the management of the public enterprises have hampered its progress"

- "Politics has more to do with change than economics, but we are not yet ready to let politics out of the closet."
- "Lack of understanding of the political economy of reform is increasingly seen as a risk to development effectiveness..."*

Political economy – *Definition and Lens*

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"... all the many activities of cooperation, conflict and negotiation involved in decisions about the use, production, and distribution of resources"*

Area of coverage	Examples	
Historical context	Central Asian countries (part of former Soviet Union)	Politics and institutions influence the direction and pace
Political context	Move to federalism (Nepal)	of SOE reforms
Economic context	Regional cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion	Key issues here are: 1. Nature of broad governance
Values, development philosophy	GNH (<i>Bhutan</i>), focusing on holistic development	reforms 2. Historical antecedents (path
Power relationships	Among political parties (eg, in <i>Bangladesh</i>), judiciary-executive tussles, trade unions, civil society, media, etc.	 dependence) 3. Political commitment as circuit breaker
Policy environment	Subsidy regimes	L

Corporate Gover and State-owned Enterprises How improvements in markets address their

ell-run state-owned enterprises (SOEs) can offer tremendous potential as a driver of indusive economic growth and development in emerging markets.

The importance of SOEs to the economies and welfare of emerging markets cannot be overestimated: in Africa, SOEs are estimated to represent 15 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP), while in the Middle East and North Africa they make up more than 50 per cent of GDP, SOEs also play a significant role in the economies of major emerging markets such as Beaul, China, India, Indonesia and Russia.

Beyond the profit motive

The value of SOEs lies in their potential to provide efficient, reliable and affordable critical products and services in key sectors, such as power generation and water supply, transport, of and aspansive investments that are often beyond the private sector's capacity. Thus, well-run SOEs can contribute to health, welfare, education and infrastructure improvements, poverty reduction and inclusive economic growth.

However, running SÖEs well represents a significant challenge, not just for emerging markets, but for OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries as well. Faced with making commercially-driven decisions when they are charged with a product and service delivery

STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES:

Issues:

ffer must cope with a built-in tension that creates a domino effect of problems and complexities. For example, raising utility rates may make the sense from an economic perspective but doing so could create additional hardships for the poor. miss Or consider the case of a state-owned company that operates in the red. To continue providing no needed services – say clean water or retail entire banking – the company may require additional financing from the state. But propping up the SOE could constrain an already tight ne mational budget, meaning fewer resources

model that is inherently not economic, SOEs

Phi Senil Gover

Finance

for other key services. Politics and good governance: a complicated mix

Complicated mix Add political meddling to this muddle and striking the optimal balance between social and commercial goals can become a near impossible task. In theory, a SOE may have been created for the benefit of the citizenry. But the reality is that many SOEs are accountable only to whatever political party is in power. The original notion of providing efficient and affordable services to the nation's citizens is long lost. Here in first the

Subsidies, dividends, taxes, contingent liabilities, weak corporate governance (ownership), corruption, bureaucratic contestation*

The reality is that many SOEs are accountable only to whatever political party is in power. Herein lies the fundamental governance problem

The board is usually where these dramas play out. Mixing ownership and regulatory ficts of interest, as can the area bureaucraits, such

unt bureaucrats, such ninister who sits on ed electrical



the in name only, to is involved, such on a the board table onnections, rather skills and industry it on the politicaltions. Plus, being in kes it a bit awkward

lem see, they may lack is associated with n, since they may not criticular industry and on to this are the political nuances implicit in the decision-making process.

The combination of all of these factors can make su

The reality is that many SOEs are accountable only to whatever political party is in power. Herein lies the fundamental governance problem

it far more difficult for these independent directors to offer informed contributions.

Board continuity is another issue. Without any protections to curb such behavior, the SOE may be treated as a political instrument of the ruling party, operating at the whim of the government. The leader of the ruling

hie decide to 'dean house' her members and creat. try could get in the wa al- Or, the leader may u other where to place a mi und favour but still wish These governe ck performance, result the or unreliable serv not enterprises to blead not role many SORs.

enterprises to bleed role many SOEs markels, the risk s could severely impacsuch as banking or pow the national economy.

Fixing SOEs: improving governance as part of a holistic approach

At IPC we have worked with SOEs in emerging, markets around the world on a variety of governance-related issues, often in preparation for privatisation.

Recently, we partnered with our colleagues at the World Bank to develop a corporate governance tookit for SOEs, offering comprehensive guidance on ways to address the challenges that impode effective governance and efficient operations.

In our experience, we have seen that attending to SOE governance issues can contribute to improved performance of state-owned companies as part of a comprehensive and contactually reforms, nestructuring, external incentives, such as increased competition, and more private sector participation, as well as fiscal discipline.

Governance changes often begin with a more considered process around the selection of directors. For instance, in Hungary and the Casch Republe, bound directors of SOEs now must hold relevant professional degrees in finance, economics or law, or bring to the table corporate governance experience. In Chile, Israel and Lithuania, boards of large SOEs are required to demonstrate professory in good decision making and appropriate strategic planning. The issue of independent directors is also moving to the forefront in some markets, with good results. In Brazil, for instance, 20 per cent of SOE board members must be independent. In India and Malaysia, SOE boards must be comprised of at least one-third independent

Fixing SOEs: improving governance as part of a holistic approach

> criteria, in recognition that the SOE is a valuable asset with an obligation to deliver efficient and effective products and services.

Requiring SOBs to refinance on international markets, rather than relying on the government, can also have a wide-ranging and positive impact, with a disciplining effect on governance. Financial statements and governance will be subject to lender scrutiny and the cost of capital will depend on credit rating. In countries such as South Africa, such market-driven pressures should help testil a measure of financial discipline in combination with governance enhancements through enabling legislation.

Other governance improvements that can make a difference include separating the ownership function from the regulatory function, which helps to shield decision-making from the political exigencies of the moment and gives the regulator some autonomy on how the market will operate.

Such actions are not easy and there is no standard template to follow, as in the private sector. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that the effort would be well worth the trouble – recent research by Dag Detter and Stefan Foelster reveals that better-governed state-owned enterprises around the world would enable central governments to generate an astimishing \$3 trillion in annual returns – 'more than the world's yearly investment in infrastructure including transportation, power, water and telescentmunication' they note in a recent issue of Foreign Affairsmagazine.

Just Imagine how such funds - and the associated product and service delivery improvements - could supportemeging markets as they strive to accomplish their economic growth and development goals.

Spring 2015 | Ethical Boardroom

INTERNATIONAL EFFORT Improving SOE transparency has been a global challenge STRATE

ADB sees SOE reforms also as part of a bigger picture...

Target 17.1: "strengthen domestic resource mobilization... through domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection"

SOE reforms

Macro-economic governance:

capital market development, PPPs, progressively hard budget constraints, legal and regulatory measures, etc.

Sector governance and SOE-

specific inputs: independent regulation, unbundling and corporate and financial restructuring, enablers for project finance

Project finance, equity, and corporate finance investments:

NSO loan, equity, advisory and transaction services

Procurement reforms

(savings level varies in developing countries)

Base Erosion Profit Shifting

(\$240b/year loss by tax avoidance) (OECD estimate)

Encourage private capital, use of remittances

(\$600b, in 2016, *WB estimate*)

Stemming illicit financial outflows

(\$5.6t est. loss; 2001-2010; Asia accounted for 61% of such loss)*


Better use of publicly owned commercial assets

(at the central government level, these have a book value of \$75 trillion... and about the same at the local government level (*FT*, 1 June 2017)

ADB's SOE Work

Polic	у	Opera	ntions	Research Evaluation		
SPD	PPFD	Regional Departments	PSOD	ERCD, ADBI	IED	
 Overarching framework on SOE reforms (eg, in Strategy 2030) Policy work by SPD, on operational procedures related to RD and PSOD investment space 	 Use of country systems Procurement guideline for SOEs Risk analysis of procurement lapses at agency level 	 Investments by Regional Departments in sovereign operations, related to SOE reforms, policy matters, broader macroeconomic environment 	 Investments by PSOD in non- sovereign operations (NSOs), related to corporate governance reforms, equity investments, rating enhancement; corporatization 	 Ad hoc (also on-demand) analysis of SOE reform issues Country experiences Corporate governance in SOEs 	 Evaluations of ADB operations Thematic Evaluation Study on SOEs 	

Analytical and operational work support to RDs and PSOD by the SOE Working Group in 3 specific areas (as per TOR approved by Management)



IN US\$ MI	llion)													
	Approval Year													
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	sect	Energy or, \$15	2016	Total 2004- 2016
Sector											D	illion		
ENE	120	615	632	192	799	401	1,159	1,374	606	2,108	1,590	3,039	1,913	15,149
TRA	0	1,208	402	490	876	377	685	189	64	203	327	33	684	5,537
WUS	30	56	53	80	40	177	16	641	351	312	142		~	2,566
PSM	223	378	200	350	325	1,131	506	25	31	0	1	In	31	4,841
FIN	40	26	1,005	1,000	165	100	200	240	40	632	('	ransport	14	4,740
ANR	0	74	45	0	0	0	0	110	0	80	¢	sector, 5.5 billion	250	604
IND	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0		375	375
ICT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	0	25
MUL	0	15	442	315	280	420	250	11	0	0	0	0	0	1,732
EDU	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
HLT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	50
Total	413	2,372	2,779	2,427	2,485	2,606	2,917	2,589	1,092	3,335	3,382	4,890	4,431	35,719
Source: AE)B SOE D	atabase			SOV	20 20	5 % of to 16: 38.9 15: 46.6 14: 39.7)% 5%	loans					5.7 lion
tes:						20	11.00.1	70						

Table 2: ADB Loans to Sovereign Projects with SOE Engagement, By Approval Year, By Sector, 2004 to 2016 (In US\$ Million)

Huge increase in loans to ENE sector in 2010. Almost \$ 2 billion be 2016.

Spike in 2009 in PSM sector. ADB assistance to DMCs hit by 2009 financial crisis – CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) crash. Almost all SOE reforms. IED undertaking evaluation of ADB support for SOE reforms.

In hard core infrastructure sectors (ENE, TRA, WUS): 64.7%

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Approval Year In Energy NA 1 Total sector, 2004-\$3.6 billion Sector ENE 3,628 TRA WUS In Finance PSM sector, \$1.6 FIN .669 billion ANR IND ICT MUL EDU HLT 1.067 7,237 Total NSO SOE, as % of total NSO loans Source: ADB SOE Database 2016: 32.0% \$7.2 Notes: 2015: 49.6% billion RRP date March 2011. Approval year not publicly available for PN 43912 Bangalor 2014: 33.8%

Table 2: ADB Assistance to Non-Sovereign Projects with SOE Engagement, By Approval Year, By Sector, 2004 to 2016 (In US\$ Million)

In hard core infrastructure sectors (ENE, TRA, WUS): 68.3% (2004-2016)

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ADB Assistance to Sovereign and Non-Sovereign Projects with SOE Engagement, By Sector and DMC, 2004-2016								
Туре	Sovereign (of \$35.719b)							
Country	India	17%	India	41%				
	Pakistan	15%	PRC	25%				
	PRC	13%	Azerbaijan	7%				
	Vietnam	13%	Indonesia	7%				
	Indonesia	11%	Uzbekistan	6%				
	Bangladesh	8%	Others	13%				
	Azerbaijan	5%						
	Uzbekistan	5%						
	Others	13%						
Sector	Infrastructure	65%	Infrastructure	68%				
	Public Sector Management	14%	Finance	23%				
	Finance	13%	Industry	8%				
	Others	8%	Others	1%				

Where some of the gaps are (from ADB's SOE Experiences) ("poor SOE performance is the norm for most countries")

Stylized conclusions:

- Government control → political interference & noncommercial decision
- Lack of political will generally (→ institutional reforms slow)
- Strong reporting processes needed in SOEs make accountability easier
- Risk of reputation loss high
- Weak corporate governance (eg, director selection not based on skills, inadequate performance incentives, and soft budget constraints)

"While corporate governance reforms cover a broad spectrum of issues (ownership, disclosures, rules for internal management, etc.), crosscountry evidence suggests that hardening budget constraints is key to improve operational performance."

Maliszewski, W., et al. 2016. "Resolving China's Corporate Debt Problem." IMF Working Paper, WP/16/203, p. 14 (1) Difference between 'what ought to be' and 'what can be': Good Enough Governance over Good Governance Lessons from broad governance reform work in the region with implications for SOE reforms


Note earlier concepts of bounded rationality

"... good governance is deeply problematic as a guide to development"



Merilee Grindle: Good Enough Governance: A Cautionary Tale

Notions of country context and 'country systems' are important



"... developing countries, which are dominated by informal markets, are risky candidates for applying the New Zealand model... basic reforms to strengthen rule-based government and pave the way for robust markets should be undertaken first."

Allen Schick. 1998. "Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand's Reforms". **World Bank Research Observer** Volume 13, Issue 1, Pages: 123 – 131.



(3) Stay for the long haul

"The three completed programs in Assam, Mizoram, and West Bengal were generally effective **ADB** should consider providing longer-term follow-on support to help cement reform gains and institutional development."

Good Governance, Better Results

Questions?

GOVERNANCE THEMATIC GROUP

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Good Governance, Better Results

Questions for Discussion

GOVERNANCE THEMATIC GROUP

1. What is the <u>main SOE reform issue</u> in your country at the moment?

2. How are the <u>reforms progressing</u>?

3. What do you see as the <u>biggest risk</u> to this reform process?

4. How can <u>ADB help in the SOE reform agenda?</u>