







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







Regional Puzzle- RCEP

- The difficulties of FTA consolidation at the regional level are well known
- Like any jigsaw puzzle, we begin with disarray.
- But the RCEP puzzle is more than just messy—there is no solution because the pieces of the puzzle do not fit.
- The so-called pieces—the ASEAN+1 and bilateral FTAs—come in different shapes and sizes




Regional Puzzle- RCEP

- Because harmonization implies consensus, a 'race to the bottom' <u>likely-</u> country with the lobby that has the most to lose is also least likely to compromise.
- Apparent loses to a country looking to retain protection outweigh the perceived benefits to others from liberalization
- Baldwin's (2006) asymmetric lobbying theory, which explains why potential losers tend to lobby harder




Regional Puzzle-TPP

- Unlike RCEP, TPP is not aimed at consolidation since not all members have bilateral FTAs between them
- But also facing difficulties, having now missed 3 deadlines; latest was Oct 2013
- Not surprising, with TPP's agenda more wide ranging and ambitious than Doha.
- Although only 12, not 150 countries, diversity in negotiating positions remain



Global Puzzle

- All of the problems with solving the regional jigsaw puzzle are also present with global puzzle, plus more!
- Not only are some pieces of the jigsaw puzzle missing, there are also overlapping bits that are redundant and probably irreconcilable
- RCEP highlighted diversity between FTAs within a regional bloc, but diversity between blocs likely to be higher still



Global Puzzle

- Method matters- if through MRAs rather than harmonization through regulatory convergence towards a regional standard, then the merging of different blocs or expansion is even more difficult.
- Countries looking to accede would not have had any input into the negotiated outcome, and would have to simply accept whatever has been agreed

Global Puzzle

- Since some countries are members of more than one plurilateral bloc, they would need to harmonize their accords across their blocs before proceeding to merge with other blocs.
- If the single undertaking option sounds like Doha, then it is because it is similar in process, and likely to be just as difficult to conclude- Enough said!

Global Puzzle


- Consolidation at the regional or global level may be just as difficult, if not more so, than starting from scratch, as there are no discrepancies to be resolved or policies to be reversed.
- Getting a pair of countries to agree on a specific set of terms will not necessarily facilitate similar breakthroughs with third parties.





- To ignore this is to ignore ground realities and the political-economy of FTA negotiations.
- And anyone who has looked closely at the text of a free trade agreement will know how difficult the task of enmeshing even two similar agreements can be, let alone many different ones!

The Way Forward

- Given difficulties associated with solving both the regional and the global jigsaw puzzles, where do we go from here?
- While we are likely to continue muddling through with trying to conclude the megaregionals for a while yet, with bilaterals continuing to proliferate- requiring future mega-regionals?- we could soon reach an inflection point, or at least a reflection point, if not a breaking point!









Goods, Value of Imports from FTA Partners (\$ million) and Share in Total Imports, 2011 Under Negotiation or Total Imports								
Country	Proposed	Signed but not yet in	Ratified	from FTA partners				
Country	Floposed	effect	natifieu					
Australia	2,073.5	85,313.3	91,051.7	178,438.5				
Australia	0.8%	32.8%	35.0%	68.6%				
Brunei Darussalam	0.8%	1,051.8	5,267.9	6,319.7				
Brunei Darussalam	0.0%	1,031.8	5,267.9	98.79				
Cambodia	19.4	285.9	10,568.0	10,873.3				
Cambodia	0.2%	285.9	83.7%					
				86.19				
China, P.R.	61,403.0	393,988.8	428,091.6	883,483.4				
	3.5%	22.6%	24.6%	50.7%				
India	11,643.6	215,069.2	128,698.3	355,411.1				
	2.5%	46.2%	27.7%	76.49				
Indonesia	11,206.3	28,483.0	119,985.7	159,675.0				
-	6.3%	16.1%	67.6%	90.09				
Japan	516.3	520,084.7	155,639.9	676,240.9				
	0.1%	60.8%	18.2%	79.19				
Korea, Republic of	23,301.3	261,776.9	191,875.3	476,953.5				
	4.4%	49.9%	36.6%	90.99				
Lao PDR	0.3	292.5	4,198.5	4,491.2				
	0.0%	6.3%	90.6%	96.99				
Malaysia	8,199.9	40,083.8	114,938.2	163,222.0				
	4.4%	21.4%	61.3%	87.09				
Myanmar	8.8	206.7	12,756.1	12,971.6				
	0.1%	1.5%	93.2%	94.89				
New Zealand	176.3	11,247.1	17,244.7	28,668.0				
	0.5%	30.6%	47.0%	78.19				
Philippines	6,586.1	4,447.1	33,452.5	44,485.7				
	10.9%	7.4%	55.6%	74.09				
Singapore	141.6	92,555.1	228,260.1	320,956.8				
	0.0%	25.3%	62.4%	87.79				
Thailand	3,061.9	41,233.9	131,155.0	175,450.9				
	1.3%	18.0%	57.2%	76.69				
Vietnam	1,061.7	14,638.9	73,933.8	89,634.4				
	1.0%	14.0%	70.7%	85.89				
ASEAN+6 Total	129,400.1	1,710,758.8	1,747,117.4	3,587,276.3				
	2.6%	34.2%	34.9%	71.6%				

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, data downloaded May 2013

		Linder Negatistics or			
Country	Proposed	Under Negotiation or Signed but not yet in effect	Ratified	Total Exports to FTA partners	
Australia	1,221.8	171,807.1	49,213.9	222,242.8	
	0.5%	63.4%	18.2%	82.0%	
Brunei Darussalam		45.1	11,332.0	11,377.1	
	0.0%	0.4%	98.7%	99.1%	
Cambodia	0.2	1,683.6	1,371.6	3,055.4	
	0.0%	25.8%	21.1%	46.9%	
China, P.R.	65,252.7	250,016.5	612,477.6	927,746.8	
	3.4%	13.1%	32.2%	48.8%	
India	6,470.5	121,151.0	85,943.5	213,565.0	
	2.1%	39.4%	28.0%	69.5%	
Indonesia	16,711.6	31,688.3	134,433.4	182,833.3	
	8.2%	15.6%	66.1%	89.8%	
Japan	3,073.6	373,812.0	156,778.2	533,663.8	
	0.4%	45.3%	19.0%	64.7%	
Korea, Republic of	32,854.3	213,653.9	213,020.0	459,528.1	
	5.8%	38.0%	37.9%	81.7%	
Lao PDR	0.05	282.1	2,342.4	2,624.6	
	0.0%	9.0%	75.1%	84.1%	
Malaysia	6,451.9	48,901.1	143,227.3	198,580.4	
•	2.8%	21.4%	62.7%	87.0%	
Myanmar	55.4	361.5	7,115.7	7,532.6	
	0.7%	4.3%	85.6%	90.6%	
New Zealand	350.6	9,409.4	17,925.1	27,685.1	
	0.9%	25.0%	47.6%	73.5%	
Philippines	7,154.2	5,950.6	26,617.5	39,722.2	
	14.8%	12.3%	55.2%	82.4%	
Singapore	1,332.9	52,044.1	272,857.4	326,234.4	
	0.3%	12.6%	66.2%	79.1%	
Thailand	3,976.0	52,744.6	121,767.4	178,488.1	
	1.8%	24.0%	55.3%	81.0%	
Vietnam	1,455.7	34,888.9	44,429.3	80,773.9	
	1.6%	37.6%	47.8%	87.0%	
ASEAN+6 Total	146,361.5	1,368,439.8	1,900,852.3	3,415,653.5	
	2.9%	26.8%	37.3%	67.0%	

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, data downloaded May 2013






Preferential trade by agreement/type of regime, 2008, selected regimes

Regime	Share of trade by preferential margin (PM) and MFN rate (in per Preferential Trade							.	
	Total Preferential	PM>20%	PM 10.1% to 20%	PM 5.1% to 10%	PM 2.6% to 5%	PM 0.1% to 2.5%	Total Non- Preferential, >0	Total MFN Zero	Trade weighted pref. margin (percentage points)
ntra-ASEAN	20.1	2.0	2.0	2.6	4.7	8.7	3.6	72.9	1.7
Singapore-USA	7.2	0.2	0.2	0.6	4.8	1.4	0.0	92.7	0.3
lapan-Singapore	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	2.4	0.6	1.9	94.0	0.1
Australia-Singapore	6.4	0.0	0.0	0.2	6.1	0.0	0.0	93.6	0.4
ndia-Singapore	20.0	0.0	0.0	8.7	6.6	4.6	16.2	59.6	1.(









- Bali has shown that multilateral deals are still possible, sector-wise at least
- Single undertaking unlikely, and maybe less so now, but still may not be enough
- Would dilute but not remove preferences, or the contradictions
- Regionalism has remained, indeed thrived, despite many successful GATT Rounds



- Time is ripe to seriously consider multilateralization of preferences as a way out of current mess of preferential dealswith or without more multilateralism
- History supports viability of unilateralism
- Very small share of trade travels preferentially at a high cost of implementing FTAs
- For NTBs, multilateralization is natural, & incumbency requires national reforms

